The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is the set of European Union rules for coordinating and disciplining the fiscal policies of member states, so that budget deficits and public debt stay at sustainable levels within Economic and Monetary Union. Agreed in 1997, it gives operational form to the Treaty's reference values of 3% of GDP for the government deficit and 60% of GDP for government debt. It applies to all EU countries, although the strongest sanctions apply only to those that use the euro.
The pact rests on the idea that in a monetary union with a single monetary policy but national budgets, excessive borrowing by one government can push up interest rates or create risks for the others, and can put pressure on the central bank. It works alongside the Treaty's ban on monetary financing and its no-bail-out clause. The European Commission monitors compliance and the Council of the EU, usually meeting as ECOFIN, takes the decisions.
Origins
The deficit and debt limits first appeared in the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, which countries had to meet to adopt the euro. Germany pressed for rules that would keep applying once the euro was in place, and the pact was agreed at the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997. Its legal basis was a European Council resolution and two Council regulations: No 1466/97 on budgetary surveillance and the coordination of economic policies, and No 1467/97 on the excessive deficit procedure.
Preventive and corrective arms
The pact has two parts:
- Preventive arm. It aims to keep budgets sound in normal times. Until 2024 each country had a medium-term budgetary objective, generally expressed as a structural balance, and set out its plans in an annual stability programme (euro area countries) or convergence programme (other member states).
- Corrective arm. This is the excessive deficit procedure (EDP), opened when a country's deficit exceeds 3% of GDP, or its debt is above 60% and not falling at a satisfactory pace. The Council sets a deadline for correction and can, for euro area countries, require deposits or impose fines if the country does not act.
Since 2011 surveillance under both arms has been organised through the European Semester, the EU's annual cycle of economic and fiscal policy coordination.
Reforms up to 2023
The pact soon came under strain. In November 2003 the ECOFIN Council declined to take the next steps in the procedures against France and Germany, and the Court of Justice partly annulled its conclusions in 2004. A 2005 reform gave more room for country-specific objectives and for economic conditions and structural reforms. The six-pack of 2011 added an expenditure benchmark, an operational debt rule and reverse qualified majority voting on sanctions, and the two-pack of 2013 required euro area countries to submit draft budgetary plans to the Commission each autumn. The Fiscal Compact, in force from 1 January 2013, required balanced-budget rules in national law for the countries bound by it. In March 2020 the general escape clause was activated in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, allowing a temporary departure from the normal adjustment requirements; it remained active until the end of 2023.
The 2024 framework
A new economic governance framework entered into force on 30 April 2024, the largest overhaul since the pact was created. It keeps the 3% and 60% reference values but replaces structural balance targets with a single operational indicator: a path for net expenditure, meaning government spending net of interest, discretionary revenue measures, the cyclical part of unemployment spending and spending financed by EU funds. Each country agrees a national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, normally covering four years and extendable to seven if it commits to reforms and investment, based on a debt sustainability analysis by the Commission. These plans replaced stability and convergence programmes, and countries report on them in annual progress reports. Safeguards require a minimum yearly fall in debt ratios above 60% and a safety margin below the 3% deficit limit. National escape clauses allow deviations in exceptional circumstances, and in 2025 a number of member states used them to accommodate higher defence spending.
Criticism
The pact has been criticised from several directions. Its numerical limits have been called arbitrary, and the structural balance relied on estimates of potential output that were often revised. The rules became complex and enforcement weak: no fine has ever been imposed for an excessive deficit, and in 2016 the fines that could have applied to Spain and Portugal were cancelled. Some economists argued that the rules encouraged pro-cyclical austerity during the debt crisis, while others said they were too lax to stop debt building up in good times. Supporters credit the pact with anchoring expectations of fiscal discipline. The 2024 reform aims to give countries more ownership and a simpler indicator, but its effect on debt reduction is not yet clear.