Social preferences and fairness is the area of economics that studies why people care about what happens to others, and not only about their own payoffs. The standard model assumes self-interest: each person maximizes their own material gain. Laboratory experiments, field studies and everyday behavior, from charitable giving to tipping, show that many people are also willing to help others, to repay kindness, to punish unfairness and to follow shared rules even when no one is watching.
These ideas are central to behavioral economics and to the design of contracts, taxes and public programs. The members of this family nest together: social preferences is the umbrella term; altruism, reciprocity and inequality aversion are its main forms; and social norms are the shared expectations through which a society enforces them. Much of the evidence comes from simple experimental games (see types of games in game theory), notably the dictator, ultimatum, trust and public goods games.
Social preferences are preferences that place weight on the outcomes of other people as well as on one's own. A person with social preferences may accept less money in order to give more to someone else, to reward a partner who behaved well or to punish one who behaved badly. Such preferences are not irrational; they change what is being maximized.
The evidence comes largely from experimental games. In the dictator game, one player decides how to split a sum with a passive partner, and many give a positive share although nothing compels them. In the ultimatum game, a proposer offers a split that a responder can accept or reject, in which case both get nothing; low offers are often rejected, and proposers tend to offer substantial shares. Results vary across societies, suggesting culture and context matter. Social preferences also explain why material incentives sometimes backfire: when day-care centers in Israel introduced a fine for late pick-up, more parents arrived late, treating the fine as a price.
Altruism
Altruism is the willingness to bear a cost in order to benefit someone else without expecting a return. In economic models an altruistic person's utility rises when another person's well-being rises (see utility and preferences in consumer theory), so giving can be a rational choice given those preferences. Altruism ranges from family transfers, such as paying for children's education or leaving bequests, to anonymous donations to strangers.
Altruism challenges the purely self-interested picture of economic man without overturning economics: altruists still respond to prices, for instance giving more when donations are tax-deductible. In dictator games many people give part of their endowment to an anonymous partner, though amounts fall when anonymity is stronger or the money had to be earned, suggesting that concern for reputation is part of the motive. Economists separate pure altruism, caring only about the recipient's outcome, from warm-glow giving, in which the giver values the act of giving itself, a distinction associated with James Andreoni. Vehicles such as a donor-advised fund show how giving is organized in practice.
Reciprocity
Reciprocity, as a social preference, is the tendency to respond to kindness with kindness and to unfairness or harm with punishment, even when doing so is costly and brings no future benefit. Positive reciprocity rewards cooperative behavior; negative reciprocity punishes those who break rules or treat others badly. It is distinct from reciprocity in trade or law, where countries grant one another equivalent treatment.
Experiments show both forms. In the trust game, an investor sends money to a trustee, the amount is multiplied, and the trustee chooses how much to send back; many trustees return more than the investor sent. In ultimatum games, responders reject offers they see as unfair. In repeated public goods games, contributions tend to decline as cooperators become discouraged by the free-rider problem, but stay much higher when players can punish non-contributors, even at a cost to themselves. Reciprocity helps explain the provision of public goods by voluntary groups and why employers who pay above-market wages may get more effort in return, an idea known as gift exchange.
Inequality Aversion
Inequality aversion is a preference against unequal outcomes, strong enough that a person may give up part of their own payoff to make outcomes more equal. The best-known formal model, by Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt (1999), distinguishes two forms. Disadvantageous inequality aversion is dislike of being behind others, a kind of envy. Advantageous inequality aversion is discomfort at being ahead, a kind of guilt; in experiments it is usually the weaker of the two.
In the Fehr-Schmidt model a person's utility falls with the gap between their payoff and other people's, with separate weights for being behind and being ahead. The model explains why responders in ultimatum games reject low offers, preferring nothing to watching the proposer take far more, and why some proposers make generous offers. It also helps account for concern about pay ratios within firms and public support for income redistribution. Inequality aversion concerns relative outcomes, so it differs from altruism, which values other people's gains at any level. Measures such as the Gini coefficient describe inequality; inequality aversion describes how people feel about it.
Social Norm
A social norm is a shared understanding about how people in a group should behave, backed by the approval of others and the expectation that they will comply. Norms differ from laws in being enforced informally, through praise, shame, gossip or exclusion, and from personal tastes in that a person follows them partly because others do and expect it.
Norms shape many economic choices. Tipping in restaurants follows a norm rather than a contract, and the expected amount differs widely between countries. Tax compliance is higher where paying is seen as normal and tax evasion as shameful, so tax authorities have tested reminder letters stating that most people in the recipient's area pay on time. Norms of fairness limit how far firms can raise prices in a shortage without customer backlash. Policymakers use descriptive norms, information about what others actually do, to encourage saving, energy conservation and tax payment. Norms can sustain cooperation and social capital, but they can also preserve harmful practices long after their original purpose has gone.
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Social Preferences