A Shariah governance framework is the set of structures, processes and rules through which an Islamic bank, takaful operator, fund manager or other Islamic financial institution makes sure that its products and operations comply with Shariah. It defines who issues rulings, who checks that they are followed, who gives independent assurance, and how all of these relate to the board of directors, management and the regulator.
The term is used in two senses. It can mean an institution's own internal arrangements, and it is also the name several central banks give to the regulation setting minimum requirements for those arrangements. Both sit alongside ordinary corporate governance and risk management, and exist because Shariah compliance is part of the promise an Islamic bank makes to customers and investors: a breach can create legal, financial and reputational risk, as well as income that must be given away.
Core components
Most frameworks are built from the same elements:
- The Shariah supervisory board. A committee of qualified scholars that approves products, issues rulings and reports on the institution's compliance each year.
- The Shariah compliance function. An in-house team that checks transactions and processes as business is done.
- Shariah review. A periodic assessment of whether operations matched the rulings, often by a dedicated unit reporting to the Shariah board.
- Shariah audit. Independent assurance, usually by internal audit with trained staff, and in some jurisdictions by an external firm.
- Shariah risk management. Identification and monitoring of Shariah non-compliance risk within the wider risk framework.
- Research and secretariat support. Staff who prepare cases, draft documents and keep records of decisions.
The framework also sets out processes such as the Shariah product approval workflow, the handling of breaches and income purification, and Shariah governance disclosure to the public.
International standards
Two international bodies set the main reference standards. The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), based in Kuala Lumpur, issued Guiding Principles on Shariah Governance Systems for institutions offering Islamic financial services in 2009, known as IFSB-10. They emphasise the competence, independence, confidentiality and consistency of Shariah boards, and the need for internal and external review. The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), based in Bahrain, publishes governance standards covering the appointment, composition and reports of Shariah boards and the conduct of internal and external Shariah review, alongside its Shariah and accounting standards.
These standards are not binding in themselves. Their force depends on whether national regulators adopt them. Some jurisdictions require AAOIFI standards outright, while others write their own rules and draw on IFSB principles.
Centralised and decentralised models
National approaches fall broadly into two groups. In centralised models, a Shariah authority at national level, often at the central bank, issues rulings that bind all institutions and may oversee their individual boards. Malaysia is the leading example: the Shariah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia has statutory authority, and the central bank's Shariah governance policy document, issued in 2019 and replacing an earlier framework, sets detailed requirements for boards, Shariah committees and control functions. The United Arab Emirates established a Higher Shari'ah Authority at its central bank, and Pakistan, Indonesia and several other countries also have national Shariah bodies.
In decentralised models, each institution's own board is the main source of rulings and the regulator focuses on governance processes rather than Shariah content. The Gulf markets historically followed this path, although the trend in many of them has been towards greater central oversight and standardisation. Bahrain combines a national Shariah board at the central bank with a requirement that banks follow AAOIFI standards.
Key design issues
Regulators and institutions repeatedly face a few questions. The first is independence. A Shariah board that relies on management for its appointment and fees may be reluctant to reject products, so frameworks set rules on appointment, remuneration and conflicts, covered under Shariah supervisory board independence. The second is the supply of qualified scholars: the same individuals have often sat on many boards, prompting limits on multiple appointments. The third is consistency. Different boards can reach different conclusions on similar products, such as tawarruq or certain sukuk structures, which can confuse customers and complicate cross-border deals. The fourth is accountability: frameworks must make clear that the board of directors, not the Shariah board, carries final responsibility for the institution, while respecting the Shariah board's authority over rulings.
In practice
Within an institution, the framework is documented in a Shariah governance policy, board charters, and procedures for escalation and reporting, often supported by a Shariah governance escalation matrix. Supervisors examine it in on-site inspections, and weaknesses lead to Shariah governance remediation. For conventional banks operating an Islamic window, frameworks also require separation of funds and records, so that Shariah-compliant business is not mixed with interest-based activity.