Schnorr-signed ElGamal encryption combines two older pieces of cryptography. ElGamal encryption, published by Taher Elgamal in 1985, is a public-key scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem: a message is encrypted with the recipient's public key and a fresh random value, producing a two-part ciphertext. Plain ElGamal is "malleable", meaning an attacker who cannot read a ciphertext can still change it in a controlled way, for instance multiplying the hidden value, and the change will pass unnoticed.
The fix is to have the sender add a Schnorr proof, in effect a digital signature made with the random value used during encryption. It shows that whoever produced the ciphertext knew that value, so a tampered or copied ciphertext fails the check and can be rejected. The result is a non-malleable scheme suitable for settings such as electronic voting, where encrypted ballots must not be altered or replayed. It is a research and specialist construction rather than a common blockchain building block, which mostly relies on signatures such as ECDSA and Schnorr alone.
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