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Say-on-Pay

Legal Law and EnforcementUpdated 17 Nov 2026
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Say-on-pay is a shareholder vote on the pay of a company's directors and senior executives. Depending on the country, the vote may be advisory, meaning the board is not bound by the result, or binding, meaning the company cannot pay outside an approved policy. It gives owners a direct voice on remuneration, which is otherwise decided by the board of directors and its remuneration committee.

The practice spread from the United Kingdom in the early 2000s to many other markets, including the United States, Australia and the European Union. It sits alongside other governance tools such as director elections, a remuneration clawback policy and pay disclosure in the annual report. Votes are cast at the annual general meeting, mostly by institutional investors through proxy voting.

01

Say-on-pay in the United States

Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 added section 14A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Public companies subject to the SEC proxy rules must hold a non-binding vote on the compensation of their named executive officers at least once every three years, and a separate vote at least once every six years on how often the say-on-pay vote should be held: every one, two or three years. The requirement applied from annual meetings held on or after 21 January 2011. Most companies now hold the vote every year, which has been the frequency most shareholders choose.

The vote covers pay as disclosed in the proxy statement circulated during proxy solicitation, including the compensation discussion and analysis and the summary compensation table. Dodd-Frank also requires an advisory vote on golden parachute arrangements in connection with mergers. Because the vote is advisory, the board need not change anything after a defeat, but companies must disclose in the next proxy statement whether and how they took the result into account. Emerging growth companies are exempt while they keep that status.

02

Say-on-pay in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom introduced an annual advisory vote on the directors' remuneration report for quoted companies in 2002. The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 added a binding vote on the directors' remuneration policy from October 2013. Under the Companies Act 2006 as amended, a quoted company must put its policy to shareholders at least every three years, or sooner if it wants to change it, and may make payments to directors only if they are consistent with the approved policy. If the annual advisory vote on the implementation report fails, the company must put its policy to a fresh vote at the next accounts meeting.

The UK Corporate Governance Code adds a softer layer: when 20% or more of votes are cast against a board-recommended resolution, the company should explain how it intends to consult shareholders and publish an update within six months. This expectation is reported through the corporate governance compliance statement.

03

Other countries

The revised Shareholder Rights Directive of 2017 requires listed companies in the European Union to hold a vote on a remuneration policy at every material change and at least every four years, and an annual advisory vote on the remuneration report; member states may make the policy vote advisory. Australia's two-strikes rule, in force since 2011, requires a listed company whose remuneration report receives 25% or more votes against at two consecutive annual general meetings to put a resolution on whether to hold fresh elections for the board, known as a spill resolution. Other markets, including Canada, rely on voluntary advisory votes adopted by many issuers.

04

How investors vote

Institutional investors set out their approach in voting policies and stewardship reports, and many draw on research from proxy advisers. Investment stewardship teams look at several features of a pay package:

  • Pay for performance. Investors compare pay outcomes with total shareholder return and financial results over several years.
  • Structure. Support is stronger where a high share of pay is delivered in long-term, performance-tested shares or share options, with holding periods after vesting.
  • Quantum. Large increases in salary or award levels need a convincing explanation.
  • Disclosure. Clear targets and a full explanation of how they were set and assessed reduce the risk of opposition.

Most say-on-pay resolutions pass comfortably. Defeats are rare but attract wide attention and are usually followed by consultation with large holders, changes to incentive plans or a change of remuneration committee chair.

05

Effects and criticism

Research on the effects of say-on-pay is mixed. Supporters argue that it has improved disclosure, increased dialogue between boards and investors, and tied pay more closely to performance. Critics argue that it has done little to slow the long-run growth of pay for the chief executive and other senior managers, that it encourages standardised designs that follow proxy adviser guidelines, and that it shifts responsibility from boards to shareholders. Binding policy votes give owners more power but can make it harder for companies to recruit or respond to change between votes. Activist investors sometimes cite failed or narrow votes in campaigns against boards.

Last updated 17 Nov 2026
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