Post-quantum cryptography is the family of cryptographic algorithms designed to remain secure even against an attacker with a large, working quantum computer. It concerns mainly public-key methods, the systems used for key exchange and digital signatures, because these are the ones that known quantum algorithms threaten most. The algorithms run on ordinary computers; only the attacker is assumed to have quantum hardware.
The field matters to banks, payment networks and blockchains because nearly all of them rely on RSA or elliptic-curve schemes to protect connections, authorise payments and control assets. It is distinct from quantum cryptography, such as quantum key distribution, which uses quantum physics itself to protect data and needs special equipment. Post-quantum methods are designed as replacements for existing software, and the move to them is often described as a migration rather than a new technology.
Why quantum computers are a threat
A quantum computer stores information in qubits and can run certain algorithms far faster than a classical machine. In 1994 Peter Shor described an algorithm that factors large numbers and solves discrete logarithms efficiently on such a machine. Those two problems underpin RSA, Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), so a sufficiently large quantum computer could derive a private key from its public key. A second result, Grover's algorithm, speeds up brute-force search, but only quadratically; it is usually handled by using longer keys for symmetric encryption and longer outputs for hash functions rather than by replacing them.
No machine able to break today's key sizes is publicly known to exist, and estimates of when one might arrive vary widely. The concern is nonetheless immediate for two reasons. Data encrypted today can be recorded and decrypted later, an approach described as "harvest now, decrypt later". And replacing cryptography across large systems takes many years: every protocol, device, certificate and stored key has to be found, upgraded and tested, a task often described as building crypto-agility into systems so that algorithms can be swapped without redesign.
Main approaches
Post-quantum schemes rest on mathematical problems for which no efficient quantum attack is known:
- Lattice-based cryptography. Built on hard problems in high-dimensional lattices, it offers fast key exchange and signatures with moderately sized keys and is the basis of most leading proposals.
- Hash-based signatures. These rely only on the security of a cryptographic hash function such as SHA-256 and are well understood, but their signatures are large.
- Code-based and other families. Schemes based on error-correcting codes, multivariate equations or isogenies have also been studied; some are mature, while others were broken during public review.
Standards
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) began a public competition in 2016 to select post-quantum algorithms. In August 2024 it published its first three finished standards: FIPS 203, a lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism (ML-KEM, derived from CRYSTALS-Kyber); FIPS 204, a lattice-based signature scheme (ML-DSA, derived from CRYSTALS-Dilithium); and FIPS 205, a stateless hash-based signature scheme (SLH-DSA, derived from SPHINCS+). Further algorithms have been selected as alternatives. Protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) are being extended with hybrid modes that combine a classical and a post-quantum exchange, so that a connection stays secure if either one holds.
Implications for blockchains
Bitcoin and Ethereum control funds with elliptic-curve signatures, so a capable quantum computer could in principle forge transactions. The exposure depends on whether the public key is visible on-chain. Many address formats publish only a hash of the key until the owner spends, which gives some protection, but keys become visible after the first spend from an address, early Bitcoin outputs paid directly to public keys, and Taproot outputs expose a key by design. Coins in long-dormant addresses with visible keys are therefore often cited as the most exposed.
Moving a blockchain to post-quantum signatures is difficult. The new signatures are much larger than ECDSA or Schnorr signatures, which raises storage and fee costs, and changing the signature rules requires a soft fork or hard fork agreed by the network. Every holder would also need to move funds to new addresses, and the treatment of coins whose owners never move them is contested. Proposals for both networks exist, but as of late 2026 neither has adopted a post-quantum signature scheme at the base layer. Custodians and banks face a parallel task in their own key management, including the firmware of each hardware security module (HSM) they rely on.
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