The mutual agreement procedure (MAP) is a dispute resolution mechanism found in double tax treaties that allows the competent authorities of the treaty countries, usually officials of the tax administrations or finance ministries, to consult each other and resolve cases where a taxpayer faces taxation not in accordance with the treaty. Its most common use is to eliminate economic double taxation arising from transfer pricing adjustments, but it also covers disputes over residence, permanent establishment and withholding taxes.
The procedure is set out in Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, and a similar article appears in the UN Model and in almost every bilateral treaty. MAP operates alongside domestic remedies such as appeals and litigation, and it is government to government: the taxpayer initiates the case and supplies information but is not a party to the negotiations.
How the procedure works
Under Article 25 of the OECD Model, the procedure has three main elements:
- Presenting a case. A person who considers that the actions of one or both countries result, or will result, in taxation not in accordance with the treaty may present the case to the competent authority. Since the 2017 update to the Model, the case can be presented to the authority of either country. The standard time limit is three years from the first notification of the action giving rise to the taxation.
- Resolution. If the objection appears justified and the authority cannot itself give relief, it must endeavour to resolve the case by mutual agreement with the other authority. Any agreement is to be implemented notwithstanding time limits in domestic law.
- Interpretation. The authorities may also agree on difficulties or doubts in interpreting or applying the treaty, and consult on double taxation in cases not otherwise provided for.
The obligation is to endeavour to resolve, not to reach agreement. Where no agreement is reached, the taxpayer may remain double taxed unless an arbitration provision applies. A typical transfer pricing case ends with one country withdrawing part of its adjustment, the other granting a corresponding adjustment under Article 9(2) of the Model, or a combination of both. Bilateral advance pricing agreements are usually negotiated under the same article.
Interaction with domestic remedies
Taxpayers can usually pursue MAP and domestic appeals at the same time, but many countries will not depart from a decision of their own courts, so a court ruling can end the possibility of a MAP solution in that country. Practice varies on whether tax must be paid, or collection suspended, while a case is pending. Some countries also treat audit settlements as closing off access to MAP, a practice the OECD minimum standard seeks to make transparent.
BEPS Action 14 and the minimum standard
MAP cases were long criticised as slow and uncertain. Action 14 of the OECD and G20 base erosion and profit shifting project, published in 2015, set a minimum standard to make dispute resolution more effective. Members of the Inclusive Framework committed, among other things, to:
- Include Article 25 paragraphs 1 to 3 in their treaties and implement them in good faith.
- Provide access to MAP in transfer pricing cases and publish clear MAP guidance.
- Resolve cases within an average target timeframe of 24 months.
- Report MAP statistics and undergo peer review by the Forum on Tax Administration's MAP Forum.
Many of these changes were brought into existing treaties through the Multilateral Instrument. The OECD publishes annual MAP statistics by jurisdiction.
Arbitration
To address cases that remain unresolved, the OECD added paragraph 5 to Article 25 in 2008. It provides that unresolved issues are submitted to independent arbitration at the taxpayer's request if the authorities have not reached agreement within two years. The decision binds both countries unless the taxpayer rejects the resulting mutual agreement. Common approaches include the "final offer" or "baseball" method, in which arbitrators choose one of the two authorities' proposals, and the independent opinion method. Part VI of the Multilateral Instrument offers mandatory binding arbitration to jurisdictions that opt in. Within the European Union, the Arbitration Convention of 1990 covers transfer pricing disputes between member states, and Council Directive (EU) 2017/1852 created a broader binding dispute resolution mechanism for double taxation disputes.
Criticism
Despite reforms, critics point to the growing inventory of cases, especially in transfer pricing and attribution of profits, and to the limited resources of many competent authorities. Developing countries have raised concerns that mandatory arbitration constrains their sovereignty, and few of them have adopted it. Taxpayers note that the procedure is confidential and outcomes are not published, so there is little precedent to guide others. The outcome of a case can also leave secondary issues unresolved, such as interest, penalties or a secondary transfer pricing adjustment.