Material nonpublic information (MNPI) is information about an issuer or its securities that has not been disclosed to the investing public and that a reasonable investor would be likely to regard as important in deciding whether to buy, sell or hold. Typical examples include unannounced earnings, a pending merger or takeover, a major contract won or lost, a planned securities offering, a dividend change, a regulatory action or a significant change in management.
The concept is central to the law of insider trading in the United States. Trading while aware of MNPI, or passing it to others who trade, can breach the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, enforced civilly by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and criminally by the Department of Justice. Banks, brokers and investment firms build much of their compliance structure around preventing its misuse.
What makes information material
US courts have defined materiality in terms of the reasonable investor. In TSC Industries v. Northway (1976), the Supreme Court said a fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important. In Basic Inc. v. Levinson (1988), the Court applied that standard to securities fraud claims and held that, for uncertain future events such as merger talks, materiality depends on balancing the probability that the event will occur against its likely size.
There is no fixed numerical threshold. Information is more likely to be material if its release would move the share price, if it concerns results or transactions central to the business, or if company insiders treat it as confidential and important. Each case turns on its facts.
When information becomes public
Information is nonpublic until it has been disseminated in a way designed to reach investors generally, such as a press release through a widely followed news service, a filing with the SEC like a Form 8-K, or a publicly accessible earnings announcement or webcast. The market must also have had time to absorb it. A rumour, a leak to a few people or a remark at a private meeting does not make information public.
Regulation FD, adopted by the SEC in 2000, addresses the issuer side. When a listed company discloses material nonpublic information to market professionals or shareholders, it must make the same information public, at the same time for intentional disclosures and promptly for unintentional ones.
Legal theories of liability
Insider trading liability in the United States has been built mainly by courts interpreting Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and the SEC's Rule 10b-5. Three theories are usually distinguished:
- The classical theory. Corporate insiders, such as directors, officers and employees, owe a duty to shareholders and may not trade in the company's securities on MNPI without disclosing it. The Supreme Court framed this duty in Chiarella v. United States (1980).
- The misappropriation theory. A person who takes confidential information in breach of a duty owed to its source, such as a lawyer working on a deal for a client, commits fraud by trading on it. The Court endorsed this theory in United States v. O'Hagan (1997).
- Tipping. An insider who passes MNPI to a friend or relative for a personal benefit, and the tippee who knowingly trades on it, can both be liable, following Dirks v. SEC (1983) and later cases.
Sanctions include disgorgement of profits, civil penalties of up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided, bars from serving as an officer or director, and prison sentences in criminal cases. Company insiders can reduce their risk by trading under pre-arranged plans adopted at a time when they hold no MNPI, a practice governed by SEC Rule 10b5-1, which was tightened in 2022.
Controls inside firms
Federal law requires broker-dealers and investment advisers to maintain and enforce written policies to prevent the misuse of MNPI. In practice, firms that handle deals and research use several tools. Information barriers separate staff who receive confidential deal information, such as an investment bank's mergers and acquisitions team, from sales, trading and research. Compliance teams keep a confidential watch list of issuers about which the firm holds MNPI and a restricted list of issuers in which trading or research is limited. Bringing someone over the barrier, known as wall-crossing, is logged and approved.
Listed companies apply their own controls, including blackout periods before results during which insiders may not trade, pre-clearance of dealings, and training. Exchanges, regulators and firms also run market abuse surveillance to detect unusual trading ahead of announcements.
Comparison with EU inside information
The European Union uses a different framework. Under the Market Abuse Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 596/2014), inside information is information of a precise nature that has not been made public, relates directly or indirectly to an issuer or financial instrument, and would be likely to have a significant effect on prices if made public. Issuers must generally disclose it to the public as soon as possible, may delay only under strict conditions, and must keep insider lists of people with access to it.
The EU approach prohibits trading on inside information by anyone who has it and knows or ought to know its nature, without needing the breach of a duty that US case law requires. The UK retained a similar regime after leaving the EU.
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