A matching market is a market in which participants on two sides must be paired with each other and each side cares about who its partner is, so price alone cannot allocate the goods. Examples include hiring, college admissions, assigning pupils to schools, matching medical graduates to hospital residencies, kidney exchange and dating. In many such markets, prices are fixed, banned or only part of the deal.
The theory rests on the deferred acceptance algorithm published by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley in 1962, which produces a stable matching: no pair would both prefer each other to their assigned partners. Alvin Roth applied the idea to the design of real clearinghouses such as the US medical residency match and school choice systems. Roth and Shapley shared the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. Matching markets are closely related to two-sided markets, game theory and the study of search costs, and rely on carefully designed algorithms.
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