The LVTS (Large Value Transfer System) was Canada's electronic system for large and time-critical Canadian-dollar payments between financial institutions. It was operated by the Canadian Payments Association, which adopted the name Payments Canada in 2016, from February 1999 until it was replaced by Lynx in 2021. Banks used it for their own interbank funding and for wire transfers sent on behalf of businesses, governments and individuals, and the Bank of Canada used it to carry out its monetary policy operations.
The LVTS had an unusual design. It was not a pure real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system: each payment became final and irrevocable the moment it passed the system's risk controls, but balances were settled only at the end of the day, on a net basis, across accounts at the Bank of Canada. Payments Canada later classed this design as an RTGS equivalent. The Bank of Canada designated the LVTS as a systemically important payment system under the Payment Clearing and Settlement Act and oversaw it until its retirement.
Origins
Before the LVTS, large payments in Canada passed through the same clearing arrangements as cheques and other retail items and were settled on the next business day. A payment received in the morning could in principle be unwound if the sending institution failed before settlement, a form of settlement risk that grew with the value of the payments involved. During the 1990s central banks around the world were moving high-value traffic onto systems that offered finality during the day, and Canada passed the Payment Clearing and Settlement Act in 1996, giving the Bank of Canada formal oversight of clearing and settlement systems that could pose systemic risk.
The Canadian Payments Association built the LVTS with its member institutions and the Bank of Canada, and the system went live in February 1999. Payment messages between participants travelled over the SWIFT network. The LVTS handled only a small share of Canadian payments by number but the great majority by value.
The two tranches
Risk in the LVTS was controlled through two payment streams, known as tranches. A sender chose the tranche for each payment:
- Tranche 1. A payment was accepted only if it was fully covered by collateral the sender had pledged to the Bank of Canada, together with the tranche 1 payments it had received. If a participant failed, its own collateral covered its obligations, a model usually described as defaulter pays.
- Tranche 2. Each participant granted every other participant a bilateral credit limit, the most it was willing to be owed by that institution. A sender's overall limit, similar to a net debit cap, was a set percentage of the bilateral limits granted to it. Participants pledged collateral into a shared pool sized to cover the failure of the participant with the largest possible obligation, and any loss beyond the failed institution's own collateral was shared among the survivors in proportion to the credit limits they had granted it.
Most traffic went through tranche 2, because it needed far less collateral. Behind both tranches stood a residual guarantee: if more than one participant failed on the same day and the pledged collateral proved insufficient, the Bank of Canada undertook to complete settlement, becoming an unsecured creditor of the failed institutions. The guarantee and the collateral rules together meant that every accepted payment was certain to settle.
Settlement and the Bank of Canada
During the day each participant's position changed with every payment it sent or received. At the close the system calculated each participant's multilateral net position and settled it on the Bank of Canada's books, a form of deferred net settlement. Participants that finished in a net debit position could borrow overnight from the Bank against collateral, and those in credit could leave balances with the Bank and earn interest on them.
That structure placed the LVTS at the centre of the Bank's framework for steering the overnight rate. For most of the system's life the Bank paid a rate just below its target on positive settlement balances and charged a rate just above it on overdrafts, creating a band within which institutions preferred to lend to and borrow from one another.
Limitations and replacement
By the 2010s the LVTS was showing its age. Its technology was nearing the end of its life, its message formats carried limited payment data, and its reliance on unsecured bilateral credit and loss-sharing sat awkwardly with the stricter Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures published internationally in 2012. Payments Canada launched a broad modernization program covering high-value, batch retail and real-time payments.
The high-value part of that program produced Lynx, an RTGS with a liquidity-saving mechanism in which every payment is covered by collateral or balances and settled in central bank money, removing the need for surviving participants to absorb another's losses. Lynx took over from the LVTS in 2021 and was designed around the ISO 20022 message standard. The LVTS remains the standard example of an RTGS-equivalent design and is often cited in comparisons with systems such as the Fedwire Funds Service in the United States and CHAPS in the United Kingdom.