Incentive pay schemes are the ways employers link what workers earn to how much or how well they work. Instead of a flat hourly or monthly wage, pay may depend on the number of units produced, on measured performance, or on a premium above the market rate that a worker risks losing if caught shirking. The schemes respond to the principal-agent problem: the employer cannot watch every action, so it tries to align the worker's interest with its own.
The three schemes below differ in what they reward. Piece rates reward output directly, performance-related pay rewards measured results, and efficiency wages reward continued good behaviour with a job worth keeping. All of them change the incentives workers face, and all bring trade-offs between effort, quality, risk and teamwork that shape wages across the labor market.
Piece-Rate Pay
Piece-rate pay pays a worker a fixed amount for each unit produced rather than for each hour worked. It has long been used in garment making, fruit picking and other harvesting, and a similar logic applies to delivery and ride-hailing work in the gig economy, where pay is set per task. Because earnings rise with output, piece rates give a strong reason to work fast, and they attract workers who expect to be productive.
The drawbacks are well known. Workers may cut corners on quality or safety to raise volume, pay becomes less predictable, and tasks that cannot be counted get neglected. Employers must also set the rate carefully, since workers may slow down if they fear the rate will be cut once output rises. Many countries apply wage floors to piece workers: in the United States, the Fair Labor Standards Act requires that piece-rate earnings work out to at least the minimum wage for the hours worked. Piece rates were central to Taylorism, which timed tasks to set standard rates.
Performance-related pay links part of a worker's earnings to measured results, which may be individual, team or company-wide. Common forms include annual bonuses tied to targets, a sales commission as a share of revenue, merit pay rises after appraisals, profit sharing and share schemes such as an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP). In fund management, a performance fee applies the same idea to managers.
Such schemes work best when performance can be measured accurately and the worker controls the result. Problems arise otherwise. Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom's 1991 work on multitasking showed that rewarding only what can be measured draws effort away from tasks that cannot. Targets can be gamed, short-term results can be favoured over long-term value, and bonuses based on revenue can encourage excess risk, which is why bank pay rules in several jurisdictions defer bonuses and allow clawback. Team bonuses support cooperation but invite free riding.
Efficiency Wages
Efficiency wages are wages set above the market-clearing level on purpose, so that workers have more to lose if they are dismissed. A job that pays more than the worker could earn elsewhere is worth keeping, which encourages effort and loyalty without constant supervision. Higher pay can also cut staff turnover and its hiring and training costs, attract a better pool of applicants and, in very poor economies, improve workers' health and strength.
The best-known model is by Carl Shapiro and Joseph Stiglitz (1984), in which workers who shirk risk being caught and fired. For the threat to bite, there must be some unemployment, so efficiency wages offer one explanation for involuntary unemployment. A famous historical example is Henry Ford's five-dollar day, introduced in 1914, which roughly doubled pay at his car plants and was followed by a sharp fall in staff turnover. Critics note that the idea is hard to test, since high pay and high effort may both reflect other causes.
How the schemes compare
| Scheme | What is rewarded | Main risk |
|---|---|---|
| Piece-rate pay | Units of output | Lower quality, neglect of uncounted tasks |
| Performance-related pay | Measured results against targets | Gaming, short-termism, excess risk |
| Efficiency wages | Keeping the job by not shirking | Higher wage bill, possible unemployment |
Ref 1100001685