Firm ownership and incomplete contracts are linked ideas that economists use to explain why firms exist and why they are organised as they are. If every future event could be written into an enforceable contract, it would matter little who owned a machine or a company. Because contracts are always incomplete, someone must hold the right to decide what happens in situations the contract does not cover, and someone must bear what is left over after fixed obligations are met.
The three concepts below form a chain. Incomplete contracts create the need for ownership and control rights. Owners are typically residual claimants, whose reward depends on the firm's success. In large corporations those owners are many and dispersed, and day-to-day control passes to managers, producing the principal-agent problem and the agency costs studied in agency theory and corporate governance.
Incomplete Contract
An incomplete contract is an agreement that does not specify what each party must do in every possible circumstance, or that cannot be enforced on every point. Contracts are incomplete because some future events cannot be foreseen, because writing down every contingency is too costly, and because some things, such as a worker's effort or the quality of a design, cannot be verified by a court even if both parties observe them.
Incompleteness creates the hold-up problem. A supplier that makes an investment useful only to one buyer can later be squeezed by that buyer, who knows the investment has little value elsewhere; anticipating this, the supplier invests too little. The property-rights theory of the firm, developed by Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart (1986) and Hart and John Moore (1990), argues that ownership matters because it gives the owner residual control rights over assets in the situations the contract leaves open. Hart shared the 2016 Nobel memorial prize in economics with Bengt Holmström for work on contract theory.
Residual Claimant
A residual claimant is the party entitled to whatever income remains after all fixed claims have been paid. In a company, employees receive agreed wages, suppliers are paid their invoices and lenders receive interest and principal; the shareholders receive what is left, as dividends or retained earnings, and also absorb losses first.
Economists such as Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972) argued that giving the residual claim to the person who monitors the firm gives that person the strongest incentive to run it well, since every gain or loss falls on them. This is why residual claimants usually also hold control rights, such as voting for the board of directors. With limited liability, shareholders' losses are capped at their investment, while creditors can become the effective residual claimants when a firm nears insolvency.
Separation of Ownership and Control
The separation of ownership and control describes the situation in large corporations where the shareholders who own the firm are not the people who run it. Ownership is spread across many investors, each holding a small stake, while professional managers make the decisions. Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means documented the trend in US companies in their 1932 book The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
Separation allows firms to raise large amounts of capital and to hire skilled managers, but it creates agency problems: managers may pursue size, perks or a quiet life rather than shareholder value, and dispersed owners have little incentive to monitor them. Michael Jensen and William Meckling (1976) analysed the resulting agency costs. Remedies include independent boards, disclosure rules, shareholder voting through proxy statements, executive compensation linked to performance, and the threat of a hostile takeover offer.
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