The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was the arrangement within the European Monetary System (EMS) under which participating European currencies were kept within agreed bands around fixed central rates against each other. It operated from March 1979 until the end of 1998, when the launch of the euro replaced it with a successor arrangement known as ERM II. Its purpose was to reduce exchange rate volatility inside the European Community after the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, and to encourage convergence of inflation rates.
The ERM was an adjustable-peg regime: central rates were fixed but could be changed by collective agreement in a realignment. It became one of the most studied examples of a fixed exchange rate system under attack, chiefly because of the crises of 1992 and 1993, which forced the United Kingdom and Italy out of the mechanism and led to much wider bands.
How the mechanism worked
Each participating currency had a central rate expressed in the European Currency Unit (ECU), a basket of member currencies. From these ECU central rates a parity grid of bilateral central rates was derived for every pair of currencies. Each bilateral rate could move only within a fluctuation band around its central rate, normally plus or minus 2.25 per cent, with a wider band of plus or minus 6 per cent available to some members.
Ignoring the small refinements used in the official grid, the band limits around a bilateral central rate were approximately:
Here is the band width written as a decimal. For a hypothetical central rate of 3.00 units of one currency per unit of another and a 2.25 per cent band, the upper limit is and the lower limit is .
When a pair reached either limit, both central banks were obliged to intervene without limit, the strong-currency bank buying the weak currency. Short-term credit between central banks was available to finance such intervention. Countries could also defend a rate by raising interest rates, and an indicator of divergence was meant to warn when a currency was moving out of line with the others.
Membership and the role of the Deutsche Mark
The founding participants included Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark and Ireland. Italy initially used the wider 6 per cent band. Spain joined in 1989, the United Kingdom in October 1990 and Portugal in 1992; the United Kingdom entered at a central rate of 2.95 Deutsche Marks to the pound with the wider band.
In practice the system became asymmetric. Germany had the lowest inflation and the most credible central bank, so the Bundesbank effectively set monetary conditions for the whole group. Other members tied their policy to the Deutsche Mark to import that credibility, an approach that worked while their economic cycles resembled Germany's.
The crises of 1992 and 1993
German reunification in 1990 led to a fiscal expansion and rising inflation in Germany, to which the Bundesbank responded with high interest rates. Other members, several of them in recession, faced a choice between matching those rates and devaluing. Doubts about the Maastricht Treaty, after a Danish referendum rejected it in June 1992, added to market pressure, and speculation against the weaker currencies intensified.
On 16 September 1992, known in Britain as Black Wednesday, the Bank of England (BoE) spent heavily on intervention and the government announced emergency interest rate rises, but sterling could not be held within its band. That evening the United Kingdom suspended its membership, and the Italian Lira (ITL) also left. The Spanish peseta, the Portuguese escudo and the Irish pound were devalued in the following months. In mid-1993 renewed pressure, this time on the French Franc (FRF), led ministers in August 1993 to widen the normal bands to plus or minus 15 per cent, which ended the narrow-band system in all but name.
Legacy and replacement by ERM II
Despite the crises, most members kept their rates fairly stable after 1993, and participation in the mechanism became one of the convergence criteria for joining Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). When the euro was introduced on 1 January 1999, the original ERM was replaced by ERM II, which links the currencies of non-euro EU members to the euro rather than to each other; its rules are covered under ERM II fluctuation margins.
Economists draw several lessons from the episode: fixed rates without free capital controls are vulnerable when members' policy needs diverge, an anchor country's choices spill over to the rest, and a currency crisis can be triggered by doubts about political commitment as much as by economic data.
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