EMV transaction processing steps are the sequence of checks that an EMV chip card and a payment terminal go through to decide whether a card payment is approved offline, sent online to the issuer or declined. The steps are defined in the EMV specifications maintained by EMVCo, with each card scheme adding its own rules and parameters.
After the terminal selects the payment application and reads the card's data, it carries out offline data authentication, applies processing restrictions, performs cardholder verification and runs terminal risk management. It then makes its own decision in terminal action analysis and asks the card for a cryptogram, after which the card makes its own decision in card action analysis. If the transaction goes online, the issuer's reply may include scripts that update the card. The results of each check are recorded in a set of flags called the terminal verification results (TVR), which later steps read. Together these steps make up an EMV transaction.
Offline Data Authentication (ODA)
Offline data authentication (ODA) lets the terminal confirm that the chip is genuine and its data unaltered without contacting the issuer. It relies on public-key cryptography and a chain of certificates: the terminal holds the public keys of each scheme's certificate authority, the card carries an issuer public-key certificate signed by that authority and, for the stronger methods, its own chip public-key certificate signed by the issuer.
There are three methods. Static data authentication (SDA) checks a signature over fixed card data; because that data never changes it can be copied to a cloned card, so SDA has been withdrawn by the schemes. Dynamic data authentication (DDA) has the chip sign data that includes a random number from the terminal, proving the card holds a private key. Combined data authentication (CDA) also signs the application cryptogram, protecting the card's final decision from tampering.
Terminal Risk Management
Terminal risk management is the step in which an offline-capable terminal decides whether a transaction should be sent online even if everything else looks normal. It protects the acquirer and issuer against fraud that might slip through if every small payment were approved offline. Terminals that always go online have little need for it.
The main checks are:
- Floor limit. If the amount, sometimes combined with recent payments on the same card, exceeds the floor limit, the transaction is flagged for online authorisation.
- Random selection. A share of transactions below the floor limit is picked at random to go online, so fraudsters cannot rely on staying under the limit.
- Velocity checking. The terminal compares the number of consecutive offline transactions on the card with lower and upper limits set by the issuer.
Each failed check sets a flag in the TVR for use in the next step.
Terminal Action Analysis
In terminal action analysis the terminal turns the TVR into a decision. It compares the flags against two sets of rules: issuer action codes, read from the card, and terminal action codes, configured by the acquirer or scheme. Each set has three parts. The denial codes list conditions that mean decline outright; the online codes list conditions that require online authorisation; and the default codes say what to do if an online-only transaction cannot reach the issuer.
The outcome is one of three requests sent to the card with the first GENERATE AC command: a transaction certificate (TC) to approve offline, an authorisation request cryptogram (ARQC) to go online, or an application authentication cryptogram (AAC) to decline. A terminal that finds a denial condition, for example, asks for an AAC, while one that finds an online condition asks for an ARQC.
Card Action Analysis
Card action analysis is the chip's own decision. When the terminal issues the first GENERATE AC command, it supplies the data the card has asked for in a list called CDOL1, such as the amount, currency, date and an unpredictable number. The card applies its own risk checks, for example counters of offline spending set by the card issuer, and returns a cryptogram. The card may keep the terminal's request or choose a more cautious one, turning a requested TC into an ARQC or AAC, but it can never upgrade a decline into an approval.
If the card returns an ARQC, the terminal sends it to the issuer, which checks it and replies with an approval or decline code and its own response cryptogram. The terminal then issues a second GENERATE AC, using a second data list (CDOL2), and the card finishes with a TC to approve or an AAC to decline. If the issuer cannot be reached, the default action codes decide the result.
Issuer Script Processing
Issuer script processing is the step in which the terminal passes commands from the issuer to the card. The scripts travel in the online authorisation response and are protected by the issuer's keys, so the card accepts only commands that genuinely come from its issuer.
Typical commands block the payment application or the whole card when it has been reported lost or stolen, unblock or change an offline PIN, reset offline counters, or update risk parameters such as limits. EMV provides for scripts that run before the second GENERATE AC, because they may affect the card's final decision, and scripts that run after it. The terminal records whether each script succeeded so that the outcome can be reported back to the issuer in a later message. Scripts work only when the card is still in contact with the terminal, which is one reason many terminals keep the chip card inserted until the transaction is complete.
Cryptograms at a glance
| Cryptogram | Meaning | Where it appears |
|---|---|---|
| TC (transaction certificate) | Approved | First GENERATE AC (offline approval) or second GENERATE AC |
| ARQC (authorisation request cryptogram) | Go online to the issuer | First GENERATE AC only |
| AAC (application authentication cryptogram) | Declined | First or second GENERATE AC |
External links
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