Emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) is support provided by a central bank to an individual financial institution that is solvent but faces a temporary shortage of liquidity, outside the central bank's standard monetary policy operations. It is the modern form of the central bank's role as lender of last resort. ELA is normally secured on collateral, often of lower quality or wider range than the central bank accepts in its regular operations, and charged at a rate above market or policy rates.
The purpose is to prevent a bank that has lost access to market funding, for example because of a deposit run, from being forced into disorderly asset sales or failure, with knock-on effects for the wider system. ELA is distinct from the standing facilities and open market operations available to all eligible banks, and from schemes open to the whole market. Because it is aimed at one firm and may carry higher risk, it usually involves the finance ministry or other authorities and is often kept confidential while it is being provided.
Principles and background
The classic statement of lender-of-last-resort doctrine is attributed to the nineteenth-century writer Walter Bagehot: in a panic, the central bank should lend freely, against good collateral, at a high rate of interest, to solvent institutions. ELA practice follows these ideas in broad terms. The central bank must judge that the bank is solvent, or will be after any planned recapitalisation, since lending to an insolvent firm risks losses for the central bank and amounts to a transfer of public funds. It protects itself with haircuts and close monitoring.
The penalty rate is meant to limit moral hazard by making ELA unattractive in normal times, and to encourage the bank to restore market funding. In practice central banks have shifted towards broader, pre-announced facilities that banks can use without stigma, while keeping bank-specific ELA for exceptional cases.
ELA in the Eurosystem
In the euro area, monetary policy is a shared function of the Eurosystem, but ELA is not. It is provided by the relevant national central bank at its own risk and cost, so any losses fall on that central bank rather than being shared across the system. The ECB Governing Council can, by a two-thirds majority of votes cast, restrict or object to ELA operations if it judges that they interfere with the objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem. National central banks must inform the ECB of ELA operations, and the ECB has published an agreement setting out the procedures and information requirements.
Euro area ELA was used heavily during the sovereign debt crisis. Irish banks relied on it from 2010, Cypriot banks in 2013 and Greek banks in 2015, when the Governing Council's decisions on the ceiling for Greek ELA became a central part of the crisis. ELA in the euro area is usually charged at a rate above the marginal lending rate and is granted against collateral that may not be eligible for regular operations, such as certain bank loans.
Practice in the United Kingdom
The Bank of England has provided ELA on several occasions. Its support for Northern Rock in September 2007, after the bank lost access to wholesale funding, became public and was followed by queues of depositors, one of the first visible bank runs in the UK for many decades. In late 2008 the Bank also provided large covert ELA to two major banking groups, which was disclosed only later. Since the crisis the Bank has reorganised its operations so that most liquidity support is provided through published facilities, and any bank-specific support beyond them, where public funds are at risk, requires authorisation from HM Treasury under a memorandum of understanding.
Other jurisdictions
In the United States, routine and emergency lending to banks is carried out mainly through the discount window of the Federal Reserve Banks, while lending under unusual and exigent circumstances to wider groups of firms is governed by separate provisions of the Federal Reserve Act and, since the Dodd-Frank Act, must be broad-based rather than aimed at a single firm. Many other central banks have published ELA frameworks setting out eligibility, collateral, pricing and governance.
Criticism and limits
Critics argue that ELA can delay the resolution of failing banks if solvency is misjudged, putting central bank balance sheets and public money at risk. Confidentiality, intended to avoid triggering runs, can also limit accountability. Supporters respond that without a credible lender of last resort, liquidity crises would turn into solvency crises more often. Post-crisis rules on liquidity buffers and resolution aim to reduce the need for ELA, while keeping it available for genuine emergencies.
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