Bank resolution is the process by which public authorities take control of a failing bank and restructure or wind it down in an orderly way, using special legal powers instead of ordinary insolvency proceedings. Its aims are to keep critical functions such as deposit-taking, payments and lending running, to protect financial stability, and to make shareholders and creditors, rather than taxpayers, bear the losses.
Modern resolution regimes were built after the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, when governments rescued large banks with public money because a normal bankruptcy would have frozen payments and spread losses across the system. The international benchmark is the Financial Stability Board's Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, first published in 2011. National and regional laws, such as the UK Banking Act 2009, the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and Title II of the US Dodd-Frank Act, put those principles into effect.
Why ordinary insolvency is not enough
A bank's balance sheet differs from that of an ordinary company. Its liabilities are largely short-term deposits and market funding that can run within hours, while its assets are loans that cannot be sold quickly at full value. Ordinary insolvency freezes the firm, stops payments and can take years to return value to creditors. For a bank this would cut customers off from their accounts, interrupt payment and settlement systems and pass losses to other institutions, a channel of systemic risk. Resolution regimes therefore let an authority act quickly, often over a weekend, before the failure becomes disorderly.
The usual conditions are that the bank is failing or likely to fail, that no private solution is available in time, and that resolution is in the public interest. If those conditions are not met, the bank goes through normal insolvency, with insured depositors paid out by the deposit insurance scheme.
Resolution tools
Most regimes give the resolution authority a similar set of tools:
- Sale of business. The authority transfers all or part of the failing bank to a private purchaser without needing shareholder consent.
- Bridge institution. Critical parts of the bank are moved to a temporary entity controlled by the authorities, which keeps them running until a buyer is found.
- Asset separation. Poor-quality assets are moved to a separate vehicle to be managed and run down over time; this tool is normally used only together with another one.
- Bail-in. Shares are written down and creditors' claims are cancelled or converted into equity in a set order, recapitalising the bank from within (see bail-in).
Authorities may also impose temporary stays on termination rights in financial contracts, so that counterparties cannot close out positions merely because resolution has started. A core safeguard is the "no creditor worse off" principle: no creditor should end up with less than it would have received had the bank entered ordinary insolvency.
Loss-absorbing capacity
Bail-in works only if a bank has enough liabilities that can credibly absorb losses. Global systemically important banks must meet the total loss-absorbing capacity standard agreed by the FSB in 2015, while EU and UK banks are subject to the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL). Both are met with regulatory capital and with eligible liabilities, typically long-term unsecured debt that can be written down or converted without disrupting depositors or day-to-day operations. Many groups issue this debt from a holding company, so that losses in operating subsidiaries can be passed up to it and the group resolved through a single point of entry.
Planning and authorities
Resolution is prepared in advance. Banks write recovery plans showing how they would restore their own position under stress, while authorities draw up resolution plans that set out which tool they would use and which obstacles must be removed. Banks may be required to change their legal structure, funding arrangements or IT systems to make them resolvable.
In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England is the resolution authority, working with the Prudential Regulation Authority and HM Treasury. In the euro area, the Single Resolution Board leads the resolution of significant banks under the Single Resolution Mechanism, backed by the Single Resolution Fund, while national authorities handle smaller banks. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation resolves insured banks and can act under the Orderly Liquidation Authority for large financial companies.
Experience and criticism
The regimes have been tested several times. In 2017 the Single Resolution Board resolved Banco Popular Español by transferring it to Banco Santander after writing down its shares and some subordinated debt. In March 2023 the Bank of England used its powers to sell the UK subsidiary of Silicon Valley Bank to HSBC, while Swiss authorities arranged the takeover of Credit Suisse by UBS outside a formal resolution.
Critics argue that authorities still prefer rescues or mergers when a very large bank fails, which weakens the credibility of bail-in and leaves moral hazard in place. Others point to the cost of issuing loss-absorbing debt, the difficulty of resolving banks that operate across many countries, and the liquidity needs of a bank in resolution, which may still depend on central bank support. Supporters reply that the regimes have already shifted losses from taxpayers to investors in several cases and that resolvability planning has made large banks easier to separate and restructure.
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