Sudan

mBOK

• Type: Mobile money platform
• Status: Operational (limited) in secure areas
• Users: 500K-1M (est.; down from pre-conflict levels)
• Coverage: Khartoum, Port Sudan, limited regional reach
• Services: P2P transfers, bill pay, merchant payments
• Provider: Bank of Khartoum subsidiary/partner
• Barriers: Limited agent network due to security; intermittent service
• USSD: Yes (2G capability)
• App: Available (internet-dependent; unreliable)
• Viability: Constrained by conflict; declining usage

Fawry Sudan

• Type: Mobile payment/bill payment service
• Status: Very limited operations
• Users: <50K (est.)
• Coverage: Khartoum only
• Services: Bill pay (utilities, telecom)
• Challenges: Limited merchant integration; infrastructure constraints
• Viability: Very low due to conflict

Interbank Account Transfers

• Medium: EBS clearing (when functional)
• Settlement: Nominal T+1 (actual: 5-10+ business days or fails)
• Fees: 20-50 SDG (~$0.30-$0.75 at official rate; 5-10x at black market)
• Rails: Bank-to-bank, nominally via CBOS
• Adoption: Limited to formal sector; unreliable
• Constraint: Infrastructure damage, staffing loss, FX shortage

• Status: Minimal; largely abandoned
• Processing: Through EBS when functional (unreliable)
• Timeframe: Highly variable (10-30+ business days when clearing functions)
• Risk: Extreme; clearing delays, bounced checks, bank insolvency

• Type: Largest commercial bank
• Headquarters: Khartoum (subject to military control)
• Services: Corporate, retail, trade finance
• Payment Services: mBOK platform, RTGS participant (nominal)
• Status: Partially operational; significant staff/infrastructure loss
• Operational Constraints: Physical damage, power outages, foreign staff evacuation

• Type: Commercial bank
• Headquarters: Omdurman
• Services: Retail, corporate
• Payment Services: Nominal EBS clearing participation
• Status: Operations severely constrained; limited transactions

• Type: Islamic bank
• Headquarters: Khartoum
• Services: Full-service Islamic banking
• Payment Services: RTGS participant (nominal)
• Status: Operational capacity degraded; staff losses

• Type: Islamic commercial bank
• Headquarters: Khartoum
• Services: Islamic banking, corporate, retail
• Payment Services: Limited clearing
• Status: Partially operational; significant disruption

• Type: Financial services provider
• Services: Limited banking services, exchange services
• Status: Highly disrupted; exchange operations main focus

• Type: Central bank
• Services: Government banking, RTGS operation, monetary policy
• Status: Severely compromised; institutional viability uncertain
• Challenge: Competing claims to authority; unclear legitimate successor

• Status: Virtually non-existent (extremely limited penetration)
• Deployment: Restricted to elite segments; international-only cards
• Processing: Through foreign correspondent banks
• Acceptance: <0.5% of merchants domestically
• Fees: 2.5-3.5% + correspondent surcharges
• Sanctions Impact: U.S. OFAC sanctions restrict card activation/processing
• Viability: Minimal; effectively unavailable

• Status: Non-functional (de facto unavailable)
• Penetration: <0.1% of population
• Processing: Foreign partnerships only (minimal)
• Acceptance: Negligible
• Note: U.S. sanctions prevent card activation

• Status: Non-functional; withdrawn from Sudan (2023+)
• Reason: U.S. sanctions; banking correspondent restrictions
• Availability: 0 (no active agent network)
• Historical Corridors: U.S., Gulf states, UK, Egypt
• Alternative: Cross-border through Egypt agents

• Status: Non-existent; limited pre-conflict presence
• Viability: No operative infrastructure

• Type: International wire transfer infrastructure
• Participants: Major banks nominally connected
• Status: Severely restricted; OFAC/sanctions compliance-blocked for nearly all transactions
• Settlement: USD/EUR via foreign correspondent banks (rare)
• Timeframe: 7-15+ business days (if processed)
• Barriers: U.S./UN sanctions, AML screening, correspondent withdrawal
• Cost: Prohibitive (10-20% total cost with spreads, when available)
• Accessibility: De facto unavailable for most entities/transactions

• Type: Postal service
• Services: International postal money transfer (nominal)
• Status: Non-functional; institutional collapse
• Coverage: 0 effective

• Prevalence: Dominant; 80-95% of cross-border flows (est.)
• Corridors: Egypt (primary), Saudi Arabia, UAE, UK, U.S., Turkey
• Mechanism: Trust-based; settlement via trade/commodity flows
• Typical Cost: 2-5% (significantly cheaper than formal alternatives)
• Regulatory Status: De facto tolerated (especially Egypt); de jure prohibited in Sudan
• Risk: AML/CFT violations; sanctions evasion concerns (high scrutiny)
• Resilience: More reliable than formal systems during conflict

• Prevalence: High; specialized in cross-border value transfer
• Mechanism: Trust-based international settlement networks
• Corridors: Gulf states, Egypt, Turkey, Europe
• Typical Cost: 3-8% (includes risk premium)
• Operational: Continues despite conflict; network resilience high
• Regulatory Risk: Highest; AML/CFT enforcement focus

• Prevalence: High for corporate/import-export
• Mechanism: Goods/commodities offsetting payment obligations
• Typical Use: Gold export settlements, oil/food imports
• Time: Highly variable; settlement via informal channels
• Volume: Growing due to formal system breakdown

• Prevalence: Dominant mechanism for FX conversion
• Structure: Exchange shops, moneychangers, street dealers
• Locations: Khartoum gold souk primary; regional cities
• Rates: 5-10x official rate; highly volatile
• Volume: Estimated 90%+ of private FX transactions

• CBOS: Claims national authority (institutional legitimacy questioned)
• Competing Authority: Military/government control ambiguous; no clear replacement
• Regulatory Fragmentation: Licensing/oversight effectively non-functional
• Impact: Banks operate under defunct regulatory regime

• AML/CFT: Law exists (Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018) but enforcement collapsed
• Sanctions Screening: U.S./UN sanctions screening effectively blocks all formal channels
• KYC/CIP: Required nominally; enforcement non-existent
• Data Protection: No modern data protection law; privacy protections minimal

• U.S. OFAC: Comprehensive sanctions on Sudan financial sector; secondary sanctions on third parties
• UN: Multiple sanctions regimes; arms embargo, regime entity designations
• EU: Sanctions on regime entities; financial restrictions
• Impact: De facto financial pariah; virtually all correspondent banking relationships severed
• Correspondent Banking: Western banks completely absent; African/Asian relationships minimal
• SWIFT Access: Severely limited; most banks unconnected or blocked
• Payment Impact: No functional formal international payment channel
• Licensing & Authorization: No meaningful licensing regime; regulatory authority defunct

• Corridors: Saudi Arabia (largest), UAE, Egypt, UK, U.S., Turkey, Gulf states
• Annual Volume: $500M-1B+ (est.; 90%+ informal)
• Channels: Hawala (85%), underground banking (10%), informal cash (5%)
• FX Spreads: 10-20% (black-market premium dominant)
• Settlement: 1-5 days (hawala); 1-2 days (cash hand-carry)
• Diaspora Base: Significant; Gulf states (labor), U.S./UK (political asylum), Egypt (geographic)

• Corridors: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Turkey, UK, U.S.
• Volume: Lower than inbound
• Constraints: Capital controls (unenforced); FX shortage
• Primary Channel: Hawala (95%+); cash smuggling
• Typical Time: 2-7 days (informal)

• B2C: Overwhelmingly cash (95%+); mBOK minimal
• C2C (P2P): Cash-based; hand-to-hand transfers
• B2B (Corporate): Informal settlement (barter, trade finance)
• Government: Cash disbursement; banking system non-functional
• Volume: Severely depressed due to economic collapse; cash economy dominant

• Type: Corporate-to-corporate; government-linked
• Mechanism: Gold/commodity sales settlement
• Currency: USD (informal)
• Settlement: Underground banking networks
• Timeframe: 3-10 business days (informal)
• Volume: Primary formal payment flow (~90% of externally-settled transactions)

• Capital Adequacy: Non-existent; most banks technically insolvent
• Liquidity: Minimal; no functional CBOS last-resort lending
• NPL Ratio: Extreme (70%+); loan portfolio collapsed
• Deposit Base: Collapsed; capital flight ongoing
• Correspondent Banking: Complete absence; no Western bank relationships
• Operational Capacity: Critical loss; staff evacuation, physical destruction
• Risk: Systemic insolvency; institutional failure certain without external intervention

• RTGS Availability: 0% effective (damaged/non-functional)
• Clearing System: Non-operational (destroyed/abandoned)
• Technology: Destroyed or abandoned; no functional payment rails
• Backup Systems: Absent; no redundancy
• Recovery: Impossible without major reconstruction; 5+ year timeline minimum

• Operational Accessibility: Banks inaccessible; locked due to conflict
• Staff Loss: Evacuations ongoing; institutional knowledge lost
• Security: Ongoing firefights in urban areas; banking sector targeted
• Physical Damage: Significant destruction of banking infrastructure
• Recovery Timeline: 5-10+ years minimum (assuming conflict resolution)

• Currency Viability: SDG de facto abandoned by population; USD/SAR dominant
• Inflation: Hyperinflation (monthly rates 50%+); monetary system non-functional
• Trade: Severe import shortage; barter economy emerging
• Employment: Unemployment 50%+; formal economy collapsed
• Payment Demand: Extremely low due to economic contraction

• Central Bank of Sudan
• Address: Khartoum (headquarters destroyed/inaccessible)
• Phone: +249 1 8376844 (unreliable/non-responsive)
• Email: Non-functional
• Website: www.cbos.sd (defunct)

• Bank of Khartoum: +249 1 4792222 (non-operational)
• Omdurman National Bank: +249 1 4714444 (minimal function)
• Faisal Islamic Bank: +249 1 4733300 (severely disrupted)
• Al Salam Bank: +249 1 4700200 (minimal operations)

• Western Union: Non-existent (withdrawn 2023+)
• MoneyGram: Non-existent

• Egypt Central Bank (alternative routing): +20 2 2770 0000
• Saudi SAMA (Gulf routing): +966 11 4652200

• Sanctions Risk: U.S./UN sanctions make formal payment channels de facto impossible; legal exposure extreme
• No Correspondent Banking: Complete absence of Western bank relationships
• Institutional Collapse: Central bank non-functional; banking system insolvent
• Conflict: Ongoing civil war; payment infrastructure destroyed; recovery impossible <5 years
• Currency Collapse: SDG hyperinflated; FX controls non-functional
• Regulatory Vacuum: No functional authority; regulatory compliance undefined
• Informal Dominance: 90%+ of flows through informal channels; compliance gaps extreme

• Significant diaspora base = remittance demand
• Informal corridor networks robust and resilient
• Gold export flows provide some trade settlement mechanisms

Do not establish formal payment corridor. Sudan is operationally impossible for formal payments:

1. No functional central bank

2. No correspondent banking relationships

3. Comprehensive U.S./UN sanctions (no exceptions)

4. Ongoing civil conflict

5. Currency hyperinflation; monetary system collapsed

6. Banking system insolvent; payment infrastructure destroyed

Alternative Approach (Diaspora Remittances Only):

1. Focus on informal channels (hawala brokers)

2. Route through Egypt as primary hub

3. Target Gulf state corridors (Saudi Arabia, UAE) as payment source

4. Structure as humanitarian/development remittance (not formal banking)

5. Require extensive AML/CFT diligence; accept high-friction compliance

Realistic Timeline for Formal Operations: 10+ years post-conflict resolution, assuming:

• Civil war ceasefire/resolution
• International sanctions relief
• Central bank reconstruction
• Banking system recapitalization
• Physical infrastructure rebuild

This directory is maintained for payment systems research and due diligence. All information reflects estimated operational status as of 2026-04-05. Sudan represents extreme country risk and operational impossibility for formal payments. Any engagement carries significant legal, compliance, and reputational risk.